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This paper is built upon the predictions of the catering theory of dividends, 
and examines whether investors’ sentiments exert significant influence on 
corporate dividend policy. To achieve this aim, we propose a dividend model 
that incorporates a variable at a firm-level proxing for the catering effect. The 
estimation of the model by using the Generalized Method of Moments 
provides interesting results. Consistent with the predictions of the catering 
theory, we find that companies in eurozone countries cater to their investors’ 
sentiments. Additionally, other relevant findings show an interaction effect 
between catering and firm characteristics; particularly, liquid assets, 
investment opportunities and free cash flow. First, we find a catering effect 
only in firms with high liquid assets. Second, the positive effect of catering is 
only found in firms with valuable investment opportunities. Third, companies 
with higher levels of free cash flow cater more strongly to their investors’ 
sentiments.  
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Corporate dividend policy has long been an issue of interest in the financial 
literature and, despite the vast research on the topic, it remains an open subject. 
In fact, since Miller and Modigliani (1961) irrelevance proposition, according to 
which dividend policies are all equivalent and there is no a particular policy that 
can increase shareholders’ wealth in perfect capital markets, many scholars 
have tried to give alternative explanations for dividends in imperfect markets. 
One of the most recent arguments that cast doubts on shareholders being 
indifferent about receiving dividends is based on the behavioural finance 
literature. According to behavioural finance, investors’ psychological 
characteristics influence the conduct in financial markets, and investors’ 
irrational behaviour limits the effectiveness of the arbitration actions. In fact, 
models of behavioural finance (see, for example, Jegadeesh, 2001) explain 
excess volatility and predictability of stock market prices by breaking with the 
complete rationality hypothesis underlying traditional finance. Within this 
context, some of the most prominent explanations (see Barberis, et al., 1998; 
Daniel, et al., 1998; Hong and Stein, 1999; among others) are based on 
investors’ sentiments. Explanations for the tendency of paying dividends in 
equilibrium clientele theories were first provided by Miller and Modigliani 
(1961) and Black and Scholes (1974). This theory suggests that changes in 
dividend policies correspond with changes in investors’ demand for dividends.  
Furthermore, companies have become less likely to pay dividends than 
what could be expected according to the changes in their characteristics, 
namely size, profitability and growth opportunities. In fact, Fama and French 
(2001) find that the decline in the proportion of dividend-payer US firms is 
not satisfactorily explained by changes in their characteristics and, 
consequently, that the dividend decision does not become exhausted by the 
individual characteristics of each company. Several authors propose 
alternative explanations for this decline in the propensity to pay. For instance, 
Banerjee, et al. (2003) argues that transaction cost-based clientele effects 
account for a significant part of the decline in the propensity to pay dividends. 
Amihud and Li (2006) also document the phenomenon called “disappearing 
dividends” by Fama and French (2001) by means of the decrease in the 
information content of dividends since the mid 1970s, which makes firms less 
willing to incur in the costs associated with dividend signalling. DeAngelo, et 
al. (2004) base their explanation on the concentration of dividends in top 
payers among US companies, as well as on the decline in the frequency of 
 




special dividend payments over the last two decades. Finally, Ferris, et al. 
(2006) find that dividends have been disappearing during the late 1990s in the 
UK because of the lower magnitude of stock price reaction to announcements, 
which is consistent with the notion of diminishing information content of 
dividends.  
An alternative explanation to the decline in the payment of dividends 
has its roots on the catering theory of dividends proposed by Baker and 
Wurgler (2004a). These authors provide empirical evidence that changes in 
the amount that companies pay on dividends can be explained by what they 
denominate “catering incentives”, that is, a measure of the market desire for 
dividend-paying stocks. The catering theory holds that firms adjust their 
dividend payouts largely in response to their investors’ demand for dividend-
paying stocks. The growing interest in this new theory of dividends1 suggests 
the need to better understand its implications and to integrate investors’ 
sentiments into dividend models. In fact, whether or not there is a catering 
effect on a firm’s payout ratio is, as far as we know, an unresolved question. 
 This paper relies on the assumptions of the catering theory, and is 
intended to empirically validate this strand of literature. This way, our paper 
provides advances to the dividend literature in two directions. First, we offer 
new evidence on the determinants of corporate dividend policy by focusing on 
the catering effect associated with investors’ sentiments. Second, we 
investigate how the dividend-catering relationship is moderated by certain 
firm characteristics, such as the level of liquid assets, the investment 
opportunities and the free cash flow. 
 To achieve this aim, we propose a new empirical approach that allows 
us to account for a measure of investors’ sentiments at a firm-level. 
Specifically, we use the error term of a valuation model to obtain a proxy for 
the catering effect on dividend payments. Assuming that a firm’s market value 
is mainly explained by its investment, financing and dividend decisions, our 
view is that the residual value captured by the error term of the valuation 
model should be a measure proxing for the firm’s investors’ sentiments. This 
variable capturing the catering effect is then entered into a dividend model 
built on the main contributions of previous research.  
                                                 
1 Since Baker and Wurgler’s (2004a) seminal paper, there has been increasing research interest in the catering 
theory. For example, Lai (2004) relies on this theory to explain the well-documented ‘analyst bias’. He 
suggests that analysts are heavily influenced by investors, and he builds a theory showing how analysts cater 
to investors’ beliefs. Gemmill (2005) examines the split-capital closed-end funds in the UK, and he finds 
empirical support to the catering theory. Hoberg and Prabhala (2006) investigate the phenomenon of 
disappearing dividends and its catering explanation through the lens of risk. 
 
 




The estimation of our dividend model by using the Generalized Method 
of Moments on a sample of firm’s from eurozone countries provides 
interesting results. Consistent with catering arguments, our findings reveal that 
investors’ sentiments significantly affect a firm’s propensity to pay dividends 
and, as expected, this effect is positive. That is, investors’ demand for 
dividend-paying stocks encourages firms to increase their payouts. 
Additionally, our study provides further evidence on the moderating role of 
certain firm characteristics on the relation between dividends and investors’ 
sentiments. Specifically, we find that the investors’ sentiments positively 
impact on dividends of firms with high liquid assets. Our results also reveal a 
positive catering effect only for firms with valuable investment opportunities. 
Finally, we show that the catering effect is significantly larger in firms with 
higher levels of free cash flow.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section 
summarizes previous literature and empirical evidence on the traditional 
explanations of dividends as well as on the catering theory, and presents our 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and variables used in our analysis. In 
Section 4 we present our model of dividends and discuss the estimation 
method. The results are discussed in section 5, and Section 6 highlights our 
conclusions.  
 
2. Theories and hypotheses  
 
In this section, we first summarize the main contributions of previous 
research to the debate on the determinants of dividend payments, and propose 
our hypotheses concerning these traditional theories of dividends. We next 
discuss the key arguments of the catering theory of dividends, which lead us to 
pose our hypothesis about the effect of a firm’s investors’ sentiments on its 
payout ratio. 
 
2.1. Traditional theories of dividends 
According to Jensen`s (1986) free cash flow theory, if a firm has cash 
flow no consumed by positive net present value (NPV) projects, it is better to 
return the cash in excess to shareholders in order to maximize their wealth and 
to reduce the possibility of these funds being wasted by managers in negative 
NPV projects. This theory thus predicts that higher free cash flow should lead 
 




to higher dividend payments in order to prevent firms from overinvesting2. 
The positive relationship between dividends and free cash flow is confirmed 
by, for instance, Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1993), and Holder, et al. (1998). 
More recently, DeAngelo, et al. (2004) show that overinvestment processes 
worsen in firms that accumulate high proportions of cash and distribute low 
dividends. In the same vein, Miguel, et al. (2005) document the role played by 
dividends in controlling for overinvestment processes in firms with high levels 
of free cash flow. Consistent with Jensen’s theory and subsequent empirical 
evidence, the following hypothesis is posed: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between a firm’s free cash flow 
and its payout ratio.  
 Financial literature widely supports the role played by debt and 
dividends as agency-cost control mechanisms, by solving the conflict of 
interest between owners and managers (see Grossman and Hart, 1980 and 
Jensen, 1986 for debt; Rozeff, 1982 and Jensen, 1986 for dividends) as well as 
by mitigating asymmetries of information between firms and potential 
investors (see Ross, 1977 and Harris and Raviv, 1991 for debt; Lintner, 1956 
and Bhattacharya, 1979 for dividends). This literature suggests that debt and 
dividends may be somehow related, although previous research is not 
unanimous about the way in which they are related. On the one hand, the 
search for a trade-off between costs and benefits leads to a substitution 
hypothesis based on the minimization of agency conflicts without duplicating 
efforts (Easterbrook, 1984; John and Senbert, 1998). In others words, this 
hypothesis holds that high leverage makes dividends less valuable, and vice 
versa3. On the other hand, the alternative hypothesis points to the 
complementary use of the different mechanisms as the most effective solution 
to a firm’s inefficiencies, because none of them can be a satisfactory solution 
by itself without generating additional costs (Jensen, 1989)4. These two 
opposing arguments lead us to pose the two following alternative hypotheses 
about the relationship between debt and dividends:  
                                                 
2 The overinvestment hypothesis has been confirmed through different perspectives in, for instance, Devereux 
and Schiantarelli (1990), Lang, et al. (1996), Lamont (1997), Chen and Ho (1997), Chakraborty, et al. (1999), 
Del Brio, et al. (2003), Del Brio, et al (2003), and Morgado and Pindado (2003). 
3 Subsequent empirical evidence on the substitutability of debt and dividends as cash flow commitments can 
be found in Moh´d, et al. (1995, 1998) and for the Spanish case, in Lopez and Rodriguez (1999), and Lozano, 
et al. (2002). 
4 Consistent with this hypothesis, the results in Eckbo and Verma (1994) show a positive and significant 
relationship between debt and dividends and, more recently, Zwiebel (1996) and Douglas (2001) confirm that 
firm value is optimized only when debt and dividends are simultaneously used. 
 




Hypothesis 2a: A negative relationship between a firm’s leverage and its 
payout ratio is expected (considering debt as a substitute for dividends). 
Hypothesis 2b: A positive relationship between a firm’s leverage and its 
payout ratio is expected (considering debt and dividends as complementary 
mechanisms). 
One of the most relevant studies on the determinants of dividends is the 
one by Lintner (1956). Lintner argues that firms seek to maintain stability of 
dividends, and he finds that a firm’s earnings is probably the key factor to 
account for in order to get a stable dividend pattern. Accordingly, regular 
dividends represent an ongoing commitment to distribute cash and, more 
important, a commitment that managers are especially loathed to break 
(Lintner, 1956; Brav, et al., 2003). Consistent with Lintner’s arguments, 
Benartzi, et al. (1997) find that changes in dividends are highly correlated with 
past and current changes in earnings. In the same line of reasoning, Allen, et 
al. (2000) argue that managers need to explain the reasons for its actions to 
shareholders, and need to base its explanations on simple and observable 
indicators, particularly the level of earnings. More evidence on earnings being 
a determinant of dividends can be found in, for instance, Nissim and Ziv 
(2001), Brav, et al., (2003), and DeAngelo, et al. (2004). Accordingly, we 
expect firms to adjust their payout ratios to sudden unexpected increases in 
earnings, and the following hypothesis is proposed:  
Hypothesis 3: The higher the earnings the higher the payout ratio. 
Consistent with recent literature (Allen and Michaely, 2002; Aivazian, 
et al., 2003), the nature of a firm’s assets influences its dividend policy. 
Specifically, gross, regular and non-regular dividend payments are found to be 
positively related to asset tangibility on the basis that greater tangibility of a 
firm’s assets facilitates its access to public markets, and it thus increases the 
likelihood that the firm adopts Lintner’s pattern of dividend policy. 
Specifically, Aivazian, et al. (2003) show that the probability of a firm to pay 
dividends increases with the tangiability of its assets. Additionally, as Barclay, 
et al. (1995) point out, the nature of a firm’s assets affects both its financing 
decision and its dividend policy. Firms with tangible assets can generally 
access the market for long term debt due to the existence of collateral and the 
subsequent ability to secure debt (Scott, 1977). One would therefore expect 
firms with a high proportion of tangible assets to be more leveraged, which in 
turn would affect dividend payments negatively if Hypothesis 2.a holds, or 
positively if Hypothesis 2.b is supported. Therefore, two alternative 
 




hypotheses concerning the effect of the nature of a firm’s assets on its payout 
ratio should be posed: 
Hypothesis 4a: Firms with a high proportion of tangible fixed assets have 
lower payout ratios (relying on the substitution effect predicted in Hypothesis 
2.a). 
Hypothesis 4b: Firms with a high proportion of tangible fixed assets have 
higher payout ratios (relying on the complementary effect predicted in 
Hypothesis 2.b). 
Finally, a firm’s size has been traditionally considered among the 
determinants of its dividend policy, and previous evidence seems to agree that 
larger firms pay higher dividends. There are several arguments justifying the 
positive relationship between size and payout ratios. For instance, larger firms 
enjoy a better access to the capital market and, consequently, are less 
financially constrained, which allows them to pay more dividends (see, for 
instance, Holder, et al., 1998; Lopez and Rodriguez, 1999; Twite, 2001). 
Additionally, larger firms are usually mature firms with limited growth 
opportunities that are prone to pay more dividends in order to avoid 
overinvestment (see, for instance, Barclay, et al., 1995). Accordingly, Fama 
and French (2001) show that the largest US companies have higher payout 
ratio. More recently, Denis and Osobov (2005) provide evidence of the 
positive relationship between the likelihood of paying dividends and size. This 
leads us to pose our next hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 5: The larger the firm the higher the payout ratios. 
 
2.2. The catering theory of dividends 
The characteristics of the firms paying dividends (that is, their levels of 
free cash flow, leverage, earnings, tangible fixed assets and size) should not be 
separately analyzed from certain psychological components in that an 
important part of the decision to pay dividends may be due to a firm’s desire 
of satisfying investors’ expectations. This kind of psychological component of 
dividends is already account for by the clientele theory. For instance, Shefrin 
and Statman (1984) extend on the work by Thaler and Shefrin (1981) and 
develop the “behavioural life cycle” theory of dividends that relies on 
psychological reasons to explain why investors prefer dividends rather than 
capital gains. Feldstein and Green (1983) find that dividend policy is a 
consequence of investors’ consumption needs. Allen and Michaely (2002) 
argue that the clientele effects are the very reason for the presence of 
 




dividends because, as found by Allen, et al. (2000), firms paying dividends 
attract relatively more institutions and perform better. Polk and Sapienza 
(2004), and Baker, et al. (2003) also rely on behavioural explanations when 
analyzing the clientele effect.  
 The fact is that theoretical and empirical dividend models are 
increasingly considering the principles of behavioural finance. Relying on 
behavioural arguments, Baker and Wurgler (2004a) develop a theory 
according to which firms cater to their investors’ preferences5, so that they pay 
dividends when dividend payers trade a premium and do not pay dividend 
when dividend payers trade a discount6. They find an answer as to why no 
consensus has been reached in the literature about dividends. Specifically, 
they argue that the dividend decision may be very important, but that it is even 
more important to base the direction of this decision on the 
prevalent/prevailing sentiment. This argument strongly supports this new 
theory – the catering theory of dividends – according to which investors have 
sentiments about dividends.  
Providing empirical support to this theory, Baker and Wurgler (2004b) 
show that changes in the proportion that firms pay as dividends can be 
explained in terms of what they denominate “catering incentives”, that is, a 
measure of the market desire for dividend-paying stocks. Specifically, they 
find a connection between the tendency to pay dividends and catering 
incentives. These authors use a market-level variable called the “dividend 
premium” as a proxy for the value that the market places on dividends (i.e., 
the premium that the investors are willing to pay for dividends-paying stocks). 
The impact of this variable on the decision to initiate dividend payments show 
that changes in a firm’s dividend policy may capture the changes in investors’ 
sentiment about paying firms related to their sentiment about non-paying 
firms. Based on this finding, they develop a behavioural model according to 
which the stock price premium carried by dividends-payers explains the 
decision to pay dividends or not7.  
                                                 
5 According to Baker and Wurgler (2004a), the catering theory and the clientele theory differ in that dividends 
had never been explored through the investors’ sentiments before. Another difference is that the catering 
theory focalizes more on the global level of dividends as the result of the demand of shares that pay 
dividends. 
6 Long (1978) provides some early motivation for this catering application to corporate dividends. Allen and 
Michaely (2002) provide a comprehensive survey of payout policy research, in which catering arguments can 
also be implicitly found.  
7 See Li and Lie (2006) for additional evidence on dividend changes being dependent on the dividend 
premium. 
 




Baker and Wurgler (2004b) measure the relative investors’ sentiment 
about dividend-paying firms by means of the difference between the logarithm 
of the book-value-weighted average market-to-book ratio for dividend payers 
and the book-value-weighted average market-to-book ratio for non-payers. 
They find a positive relationship between the catering incentives, captured by 
the dividend premium, and the change in firms’ propensity to pay dividends. 
Relying on this new view of dividends, we go a step forward and propose a 
measure of catering incentives at a firm-level (see Section 3.3 for more details 
about the construction of this variable). Therefore, our last hypothesis is as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 6:  A firm’s payout ratio is positively driven by catering incentives.  
 
3. Data and variables 
 
3.1 Data 
To test the hypotheses posed in the previous section, we use data from 
several eurozone countries. We have thus used an international database, 
Worldscope, as our source of information. Additionally, international data 
such as the growth of capital goods prices, the rate of interest of short term debt, 
and the rate of interest of long term debt, have been extracted from the Main 
Economic Indicators published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD). 
 For each country we constructed an unbalanced panel of non-financial 
companies8 whose information was available for a least six consecutive years 
from 1986 to 2003. This strong requirement is a necessary condition since we 
lost one-year data in the construction of some variables (see, for instance, 
Appendix C), we lost another year-data because of the estimation of the model 
in first differences, and four consecutive year information is required in order 
to test for second-order serial correlation, as Arellano and Bond (1991) point 
out. We need to test for the second-order serial correlation because our 
estimation method, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) is based on 
this assumption.  
                                                 
8 We restrict our analysis to non-financial companies because financial companies have their own specificity. 
 
 




 Three of the twelve eurozone countries9 have been excluded from our 
analysis for different reasons. As occurs in La Porta, et al., (2000), 
Luxembourg has been removed from our sample because there are just a few 
firms listed in Luxnembourg’s stock exchange, and Greece because dividends 
are mandatory in this country. Finally, Finland had also to be excluded 
because no sample with the abovementioned requirement could be selected. 
The structure of the samples by number of companies and number of 
observations per country is provided in Table 1. As shown in Table 2, the 
resultant unbalanced panel comprises 635 companies and 6,451 observations. 
Using an unbalanced panel for a long period (18 years) is the best way to 
solve the survival bias caused because some firms could be delisted and, 
consequently, be dropped from database. Finally, Table 3 provides summary 
statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum) of the variables 
used in the construction of the dependent and explanatory variables in our 
model, which we now proceed to describe. 
 
3.2 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in our model is the payout ratio, which is a 
censured variable in that some firms pay dividends whereas others do not. 
Note that if we took into account only the companies paying dividends our 
results would be biased. To solve this problem we should predict the payout 
ratio by using an explanatory model for this variable. We follow the model 
provided by Auerbach and Hasset (2003) based on the equality of sources and 
uses of funds, and we obtain the following Tobit model that provides us with a 
prediction of the payout ratio for each period from 1986 to 2003:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) itititititit KSBKBKCFKICPR µββββ +∆+∆+++= //// 43210                           
(1)    
 with  PRit = CPRit  if  CPRit >0 
          PRit = 0 if CPRit   ≤ 0 
where CPRit is a latent variable only observed when it is positive, whereas we 
only know that it is negative in the remainder of the cases. The explanatory 
variables of the payout ratio are: investment (Iit/Kit), cash flow (CFit/ Kit), 
increment of debt (∆Bit/Kit) and increment of shares (∆Sit /Kit). All the 
                                                 
9 The eurozone currently comprises twelve countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. 
 




explanatory variables are scaled by the replacement value of total assets (Kit), 
calculated as explained in Appendix A10. 
Taking into account that CPRit follows a normal distribution with mean 
µ and variance σ2,   and letting   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) βµββββ itititititit XKSBKBKCFKI ′=+∆+∆+++ //// 43210  







































where the first term picks up the observations for which PRit> 0 (that is, 
observations for which the payout ratio is observable and, consequently, the 
density function is known), whereas the second term refers to the rest of the 
observations for which the payout ratio is unobservable, and we assume that 
the function Φ(.) is distributed as N (0, 1).  
Table 4 provides the summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum) of the payout ratios obtained by the maximum 
likelihood estimation of the Tobit model in (1). In addiction, the estimation of 
a Probit model including the same set of explanatory variables allows us to 
check the capacity of prediction of the model in (1). As shown in the last 
column of Table 4, the percentages of correct classification are similar to the 
ones reported in previous studies. Additionally, the last row of the table 
displays the summary statistics of the new variable, CPRit, for which the 
problem of censure is already solved and will be the dependent variable in our 
model. 
 
3.3. Explanatory Variables  
According to the theories discussed in Section 2.1, the explanatory 
variables to be entered into our basic model are: free cash flow, leverage, 
earnings, tangible fixed assets and size. To capture the potential benefits of 
dividends as a mechanism to reduce the conflict of interests between owners 
and managers with respect to the allocation of the firm’s free cash flow, our 
model incorporates a free cash flow index (FCFit) obtained by interacting cash 
flow with the inverse of the investment opportunities11. We compute a firm’s 
cash flow as CFit=NIAPDit+DEPit, where NIAPDit denotes net income after 
                                                 
10 The subscript i refer to the company and t refers to the period time. 
11 Details about the interpretation of this index can be found in Miguel and Pindado (2001). 
 




preferred dividends, and DEPit stands for the book depreciation expense. 
Investment opportunities are measured by means of Tobin’s q, calculated as 
qit= (Vit+PSit+MVLTDit+BVSTDit)/Kit, where Vit is the market value of 
common stock, PSit is the value of the firm’s outstandings preferred stock, 
MVLTDit stands for the market value of the long term debt (see Appendix B), 
and BVSTDit stands for the book value of short term debt.  
To investigate whether there is a substitution or a complementary 
relationship between debt and dividends, the debt ratio also enters our model. 
The debt ratio is defined as Dit=MVLTDit/(Vit+PSit+BVSTDit+MVLTDit). We 
use in the numerator the long term debt since most of the arguments in 
financial theory are related to this type of debt (see, for instance, Miguel and 
Pindado, 2001 and, more recently, DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006).  
To test Lintner’s (1956) predictions about the relevance of a firm’s 
earnings for its dividend policy we have included the firm’s net incomes, NIit, 
in our model, measured as NIit=(PIit-ITXit)/Kit, where PIit stands for all income 
before taxes, and ITXit, represent all taxes levied on a firm’s income.  
Finally, tangible fixed assets (TANGit) are computed as the net book 
value of property, plant and equipment, scaled by the replacement value of 
total assets, and size (SIit) is the natural logarithm of the replacement value 
total assets.   
In accordance with the aim of our paper, our model incorporates a 
variable capturing investors’ sentiments. This is our main contribution in that 
we propose the construction of a variable at a firm-level that proxy for this 
catering effect. The starting point for the calculation of this new variable is the 
following value model:  
( ) ( ) ( ) itititit KCDIVDKIKV it εαααα ++++= 3210                                                    (2)    
where Iit stands for investment (calculated as described in Appendix C), and 
CDIV it stands for common dividends. Assuming that a firm’s market 
valuation is mainly explained by its investment, debt and dividend decisions, 
hence the error term, εit, captures what cannot be explained by these three 
financial decisions and, consequently, is our proxy for the firm’s investors 
sentiments. 
 Table 5 provides the summary statistics of the resultant catering variable 
for all years, obtained by cross-sectionally estimating the model in (2). The 
last row of the table displays the summary statistics of the resultant catering 
variable, CATit, which will enter our dividend model. 
 





4. Empirical model and estimation method 
 
Using the dependent variable obtained as explained in Section 3.2, and 
the traditional explanatory variables described in Section 3.3, our basic model 
is as follows: ititititititit SIZETANGNIDFCFCPR εγγγγγγ ++++++= 543210                         
(3) 
where εit is the random disturbance.  
 The basic model in (3) can be easily extended to investigate the 
existence of the catering effect by including the variable CATit, leading to the 
following extended model: 
itititititititit CATSIZETANGNIDFCFCPR εγγγγγγγ +++++++= 6543210               (4) 
 Our models have been estimated by using the panel data methodology. 
Two issues have been considered to make this choice. First, unlike cross-
sectional analysis, panel data allow us to control for individual heterogeneity. 
This point is crucial in our study because the dividend decision is very closely 
related to the specificity of each company. Therefore, to eliminate the risk of 
obtaining biased results, we have controlled for such heterogeneity by 
modeling it as an individual effect, ηi, which is then eliminated by taking first 
differences of the variables. Consequently, the error term in our models, itε , 
has been splitted into four components. First, the above mencioned individual 
or firm-specific effect, ηi. Second, dt measures the time-specific effect by the 
corresponding time dummy variables, so that we can control for the effects of 
macroeconomic variables on the dividend decision. Third, since our models 
are estimated using data of several countries, we have also included country 
dummy variables (ci). Finally, vit  is the random disturbance.  
 The second issue we can deal with by using the panel data methodology 
is the endogeneity problem. The endogeneity problem is likely to arise in that 
the dependent variable (payout ratio) may also explain some of the 
explanatory variables. For instance, the payout ratio may explain leverage on 
the basis of the arguments used to justify the reverse causality (see Section 
2.1). In fact, Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn (1992) and Mod’d, Perry, and Rimbey 
(1998), among others, document the existence of a signifficant effect of 
dividends on debt. Additioally, there are also reasons to expect size to be 
endogeneous, since, as Ferris, Sen, and Yui (2006) point out, large payers 
have continued to increase in size over the last ten years. Therefore, our 
 




models have been estimated by using instruments. To be exact, we have used 
all the right-hand-side variables in the models lagged from t-2 to t-6 as 
instruments. 
 Finally, we have checked for the potential misspecification of the 
models. First, we use the Hansen J statistic of over-identifying restrictions in 
order to test the absence of correlation between the instruments and the error 
term. Tables 6 and 7 shows that the instruments used are valid. Second, we 
use the m2 statistic, developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), in order to test 
for lack of second-order serial correlation in the first-difference residual. 
Tables 6 and 7 show that there is no a problem of second-order serial 
correlation in our models (see m2). Note that although there is first-order serial 
correlation (see m1), this is caused by the first-difference transformation of the 
model and, consequently, it does not represent a specification problem of the 
models. Third, our results in Tables 6 and 7 provide good results for the 
following three Wald tests: z1 is a test of the joint significance of the reported 
coefficients; z2 is a test of the joint significance of the time dummies; and z3 is 




 In this section we first present the results of our basic model in equation 
(3), which includes the explanatory variables that have been traditionally 
considered as determinants of a firm’s payout ratio. We then extend this basic 
model by incorporating a variable capturing investors’ sentiment into model 
(4). Finally, we test the implications of the catering theory by means some 
firm characteristics, particularly three, liquid assets, investment opportunities, 
and free cash flow.  
 
5.1 Results of the basic and extended models 
The results of the GMM estimation of our basic model in (3) are 
provided in the Column I of Table 6. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the level 
of a firm’s free cash flow positively affect its payout ratio. Hence consistent 
with Jensen’s (1986) theory, we find that firms with higher levels of free cash 
flow are encouraged to pay more dividends as a way to restrain managers’ 
discretion and prevent them from overinvesting. In agreement with Jensen 
(1989), the coefficient of leverage is positive and suggesting that debt and 
 




dividends are complementary agency-cost control mechanisms. Therefore, our 
evidence supports Hypothesis 2b according to which a new issue of debt 
requires a higher dividend payment in order to limit managerial discretion 
over the new funds and, consequently, avoid overinvestment in the firm. The 
positive relationship between a firm’s earnings and its payout ratio predicted 
in Hypothesis 3 is confirmed by our results. Consistent with Lintner (1956), 
companies in our sample increase their payout ratios when their earnings rise 
in order to get a stable pattern of dividends and avoid dividend cuts. 
Regarding the nature of the firm’s assets, and supporting the above-mentioned 
results about the complementary relationship between debt and dividends, 
Hypothesis 4b holds. That is, firms with more tangible fixed assets are more 
leveraged and, consequently, have larger payout ratios as a way to control the 
new funds. Finally, and also as expected, the positive coefficient on size 
supports Hypothesis 5, according to which larger companies pay higher 
dividends. 
 Column II of Table 6 presents the results of the GMM estimation of 
Model (4). As shown in this table, the signs of the coefficients of the variables 
included in the basic model remain identical once the catering effect, CATit, is 
entered into the model. In short, a firm’s payout ratio is positively affected by 
its level of free cash flow, its leverage, its net income, its level of tangible 
fixed assets, and its size. Regarding the influence of a firm’s investors’ 
sentiments on its payout ratio, the positive coefficient of the catering variable 
confirms Hypothesis 6. Consistent with Baker and Wurgler (2004b), this 
finding highlights the link between the propensity to pay dividends and 
catering incentives. In other words, our result suggests that firms cater to their 
investors’ preferences, so that they are more prone to increase payout ratios 
when investors exhibit preference for dividend-paying stocks.  
 
5.2 The moderating role of some firm characteristics  
Once the existence of a catering effect has been corroborated by our 
results, we go a step forward and investigate whether or not certain firm 
characteristics moderate this effect. We then propose a test of the moderating 
role played by three features – namely, liquid assets, investment opportunities 
and free cash flow. It is worth noting that, as far as we know, there is no prior 
evidence supporting this view, and providing empirical support to this issue is 
thus one of the major contributions of this paper. Despite the lack of previous 
evidence, there are strong arguments that lead us to argue that investors’ 
 




preference for dividend-paying stocks change according to the above 
mentioned characteristics. 
First, Pinheiro, et al. (2004) extend on the model by Fama and French 
(2001) by adding a measure of liquid assets, and they find that firms are more 
likely to pay dividends if they have more liquid assets. Furthermore, their 
results indicate that the decision to pay dividends depends directly on how 
much importance a firm’s managers attach to shareholders’ preferences and on 
the firm’s level of liquid assets. This leads us to expect that a firm’s liquid 
assets and its investors’ sentiments about dividends could be somehow related. 
Specifically, we expect investors’ preference for dividend-paying stocks to 
increase with a firm’s liquid assets.  
Second, it has been widely documented that dividends convey 
information about a firm’s future prospects (see, for instance, Bhattacharya, 
1979; John and Williams, 1985; Miller and Rock, 1985). According to 
signalling arguments, investors are optimistic about firms initiating or 
increasing dividends in that they interpret that such a decision means that there 
is valuable investment opportunities that guarantee the disposal of funds to be 
paid out in the future. Additionally, the managerial discretion associated with 
a high level of intangibles in the firm may make dividends more desirable for 
investors, as a way to control for such discretion. Overall, this leads us to 
expect investors’ preference for dividends to be stronger for firms with 
valuable investment opportunities.  
Third, as commented on in Section 2.1, the theory of Jensen (1986) 
proposes that dividends lessen the agency costs deriving from the conflict of 
interests between managers and owners with respect to a firm’s free cash flow. 
This theory suggests a positive relationship between dividends and the level of 
free cash flow, a relation that is confirmed by the results presented in the 
previous section. Based on this result, and given the proved role of dividends 
in controlling for overinvestment processes, we expect investors’ preference 
for dividends to be stronger for firms with high levels of free cash flow.  
 To investigate whether or not these firm characteristics moderate the 
catering effect, we propose the following model to be estimated:  
( ) ititititititititit DVCATSIZETANGNIDFCFCPR ελγγγγγγγ ++++++++= 6543210         (5) 
where DVit is a dummy variable constructed according to the firm’s level of 
liquid assets, investment opportunities, and free cash flow. It is worth noting 
that in all cases whenever the dummy variable equals one and both parameters 
(γ6 and λ) are significant, a linear restriction test is needed in order to know 
 




whether their sum (γ6+λ) is significantly different from zero. The null 
hypothesis to be tested in these cases is the hypothesis of no significance, H0: 
γ6+λ=0. 
 Column I of Table 7 reports the results of the model including the 
interaction of catering with liquid assets12. In this case, DVit takes value one if 
the firm’s level of liquid assets is above the sample median, and zero 
otherwise. This way, the coefficient of the catering variable is γ6 for firms with 
low levels of liquid assets (since DVit takes value zero), and γ6+λ for firms 
with high levels of liquid assets (since DVit takes value one). As shown in the 
table, there is no effect of a firm’s investors’ sentiments on its payout ratio 
when the firm has low liquid assets (γ6 not significantly different from zero). 
However, the effect is positive and significant for firms with high levels of 
liquid assets (γ6+λ=λ=0.02325, significantly different from zero), which 
confirms that, as expected, investors’ preference for dividend-paying stocks 
increases with liquid assets. That is, our evidence suggests that investors’ 
demand for dividends translate into higher payout ratios only in those firms 
with high liquid assets, whereas companies with low liquid assets do not seem 
to cater to their investors’ preferences.  
The interaction of the catering effect and investment opportunities is 
tested in the model presented in Column II of Table 7. In this model, DVit 
takes value one if the firm’s Tobin’s q is higher than one, and zero otherwise. 
As shown in the table, the catering effect is negative in firms with non-
valuable investment opportunities (γ6=-0.13649), whereas this effect turns 
positive for firms with valuable investment opportunities (γ6+λ=0.04613, 
significantly different from zero, see t). These results point out that the 
expected catering effect clearly manifests itself when there are future 
prospects in the firm, which grant managers the opportunity to exploit the 
potential divergence between inside and market expectations, and which make 
dividends more valuable to investors. In contrast, the non-valuable investment 
opportunities prevent firms from catering to their investors’ sentiments about 
dividend-paying stock, probably because the lack of positive NPV projects 
may lead to not being able to maintain high payout ratios in the future. 
Finally, we investigate the interaction between the catering effect and 
the free cash flow by estimating the model presented in Column III of Table 7. 
In this case, DVit takes value one if the firm’s free cash flow is above the 
                                                 
12 This variable stands for money available for use in the normal operations of the firm, scaled by the 
replacement value of total assets. It represents the most liquid of all of the firm's assets. 
 
 




sample median, and zero otherwise. As can be seen in the table, the coefficient 
of the catering variable is higher for firms with high levels of free cash flow 
(γ6+λ=0.07584, significantly different from zero, see t) than for firms with 
low levels of free cash flow (γ6=0.01104). Therefore, it seems that catering 
incentives (i.e., investors’ preference for dividend-paying stocks) manifest 
more strongly in firms with high levels of free cash flow, in which dividends 
are much more valuable as agency-cost control mechanism. This evidence 
supports once more Jensen’s (1986) theory.  
Overall, this evidence provide an excellent robustness check for the 
results of the basic and extended models, since the sign of the coefficients of 
both the traditional explanatory variables and the catering variable remain 





This paper provides a test of the predictions of the catering theory of 
dividends by proposing a new approach for analysing the effect that investors’ 
sentiments exert on corporate dividend policy. With this aim, a traditional 
dividend model is extended to incorporate an original measure of the catering 
effect at a firm-level, proxied by the error term of a market valuation model.  
 Our results show that investors´sentiments impact on the payout ratios 
in eurozone countries after controlling for traditional determinants of 
dividends, such as the free cash flow, leverage, earnings, tangible fixed assets 
and size. This finding seems to indicate that dividend policies are driven to 
some extent by investors’ sentiments, thus revealing the desire of firms’ 
managers to cater to such preferences. Therefore, our evidence provides 
empirical support to the existence of a physiological component in the 
decision to pay, as proposed by the catering theory.    
Furthermore, our study contributes to understanding the implications of 
catering incentives for dividend policies by examining the moderating role 
played by certain firm characteristics. This idea has not been accounted for in 
prior studies, either theoretically or empirically, but our findings corroborate 
that the way in which investors appreciate dividend payments depends on the 
firm’s liquid assets, investment opportunities and free cash flow. First, 
investors’ preference for dividend-paying stocks translates into higher payout 
ratios only in those firms with high liquid assets. Second, investors’ sentiment 
 




only positively impact on the payout ratio of firms with valuable investment 
opportunities, for which investors manifest stronger expectations about 
receiving higher dividends. Finally, a firm’s free cash flow is a driving force 
behind investors’ preference for dividend-paying stock, which is stronger in 
firms with higher levels of free cash flow in that dividends are probably much 
more valuable as a mechanism to avoid overinvestment.  
 
 





APPENDIX A: REPLACEMENT VALUE OF TOTAL ASSETS 
The replacement value of total assets is obtained as 
 ( )itititit BFTARFK −+=                                                                                       
where RFit is the replacement value of tangible fixed assets, TAit is the book value of total 
assets, and BFit is the book value of tangible fixed assets. The latter two have been obtained 
from the firm’s balance sheet and the first one has been calculated according to the proposals 














for t>t0 and RFit0=BFit0, where t0 is the first year of the chosen period, in our case 
1986. On the other hand δit=Dit/BFit and φt=(GCGPt-GCGPt-1)/GCGPt-1, where GCGPt is the 
growth of capital goods prices extracted from the Main Economic Indicators, published by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
 
 APPENDIX B: MARKET VALUE OF LONG TERM DEBT 












where BVLTDit is the book value of the long term debt, il is the rate of interest of the long term 
debt reported in the OECD-Main Economic Indicators and lit is the average cost of long term 
debt that is defined as lit=(IPLTDit/BVLTDit), where IPLTDit is the interest payable on the long 
term debt, which has been obtained by distributing the interest payable between the short and 







where IPit is the interest payable, is is the rate of interest of the short term debt, also reported in 
Main Economic Indicators, and BVSTDit is the book value of the short term debt. 
 
APPENDIX C: INVESTMENT 
 Investment is calculated according to the proposal by Lewellen and Badrinath (1997) 
as follows: 
    Let FAit be the gross book value of the tangible fixed assets of the period t, Rit the 
gross book value of the old assets retired during the year t, ABDit the accumulated book 
depreciation for the year t, and BDit the book depreciation expense corresponding to year t. 
Then we have the following equalities: 
FAit=FAit-1+Iit-Rit                                 (A.1) 
ABDit=ABDit-1+BDit-Rit                          (A.2) 
 If we solve Eq. A.2 for Rit and substitute it into Eq. A.1, we obtain A.3, 
FAit=FAit-1+Iit+ABDit-ABDit-1-BDit                       (A.3) 
Realigning terms, Eq. A.3 is transformed into expression A.4 
FAit-ABDit=FAit-1-ABDit-1+Iit-BDit                       (A.4) 
As FAit-ABDit=NFit, i.e. the net fixed assets, the former equation can be rewritten more 
compactly as in Eq. A.5, 
 




NFit=NFit-1+Iit-BDit                                                                              (A.5) 
From which we can obtain the value of investment: 
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  Structure of the samples by countries 







Germany 110 17.32 1,153 17.87 
France 107 16.85 1,081 16.76 
Netherlands 91 14.33 943 14.62 
Spain 88 13.86 999 15.49 
Belgium 83 13.07 907 14.06 
Portugal 44 6.93 406 6.29 
Ireland 42 6.61 435 6.74 
Austria 38 5.98 309 4.79 
Italy 32 5.04 218 3.38 
Total 635 100.00 6,451 100.00 
Data of companies for which the information is available for at least five consecutive years between 
1986 and 2003 were extracted. After removing the first-year data, only used to construct several 
variables (see, for instante, Appendix C), the resultant samples comprise 110 companies (1,153 
observations) for Germany, 107 companies (1,081 observations) for France, 91 companies (943 
observations) for the Netherlands, 88 companies (999 observations) for Spain, 83 companies (907 
observations) for Belgium, 44 companies (406 observations) for Portugal, 42 companies (435 
observations) for Ireland, 38 companies (309 observations) for Austria and 32 companies (218 
observations) for Italy.  
 
 






Structure of the panel 











18 4 0.63 72 1.12 
17 6 0.94 102 1.58 
16 42 6.61 672 10.42 
15 35 5.51 525 8.14 
14 56 8.82 784 12.15 
13 47 7.40 611 9.47 
12 46 7.24 552 8.56 
11 49 7.72 539 8.36 
10 57 8.98 570 8.84 
9 54 8.50 486 7.53 
8 63 9.92 504 7.81 
7 47 7.40 329 5.10 
6 60 9.45 360 5.58 
5 69 10.87 345 5.35 
Total 635 100.00 6,451 100.00 
Data of companies for which the information is available for at least five consecutive years between 
1986 and 2003 were extracted. After removing the first-year data, only used to construct several 
variables (see, for instante, Appendix C), the resultant unbalanced panel comprises 635 companies 
(6,451 observations). 
 





Table 3  
Summary statistics 
Panel A. Tobit model to solve dividends censure 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
PRit .38363 .34093 0.0000 1.0000 
(I/K)it .05651 .08761 -1.14290 .66487 
(CF/K)it .03952 .06031 -.72767 .40246 
(∆D/K)it .01271 .10017 -1.74563 .64275 
(∆S/K)it .00433 .02516 -.15017 .87898 
Panel B.Value model to predict catering 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
(V/K)it .63668 .68147 .01405 9.2732 
Dit .09959 .10990 .0000 .82617 
(I/K)it .05651 .08761 -1.14290 .66487 
(CD/K)it .01399 .02217 0 .47295 
Panel C. Catering model of dividends 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
FCFit .05140 .11449 -1.9768 1.1084 
Dit .09959 .10990 .0000 .82617 
NIit .02834 .06211 -.78456 .52176 
TANGit .28850 .18704 .00006 .98799 
SIit 12.6993 1.7785 8.4109 18.5011 
         
 PRit denotes payout ratio, (I/K)it denotes investment, (CF/K)it is the cash flow, (∆D/K)it and (∆S/K)it stand for 
the increment of debt and shares, respectively, (V/K)it is the firm’s value, Dit stands for the debt ratio, (CD/K)it 
denotes common dividends, FCFit is the free cash flow, NIit is the net income, TANGit denotes tangible fixed, 
assets and SIit is the size.  
 






Summary statistics of the estimated payout ratios 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Correct 
classification 
CPR86 .13018 .42393 -.57906 .72013 100.00 
CPR87 .30365 .17033 -.37441 .53203 87.50 
CPR88 .32129 .10967 .03271 .98574 83.66 
CPR89 .32494 .08542 -.35601 .52085 85.31 
CPR90 .38818 .07495 .05319 .68173 87.63 
CPR91 .40585 .04784 .07295 .58586 84.68 
CPR92 .45219 .13128 -.97013 .66520 82.51 
CPR93 .40188 .25357 -4.1673 .98977 75.29 
CPR94 .28988 .15638 -1.5087 .65421 77.16 
CPR95 .30949 .14072 -1.3781 .72779 77.46 
CPR96 .34289 .13198 -.84888 .77060 78.96 
CPR97 .28807 .08769 -.47661 .46076 79.80 
CPR98 .27967 .09732 -.64811 .50091 78.63 
CPR99 .27442 .12663 -1.9449 .39907 77.27 
CPR00 .27979 .06908 -.29269 .47720 76.36 
CPR01 .38725 .15393 -1.0219 .94066 78.72 
CPR02 .35177 .41456 -5.1497 .60144 78.45 
CPR03 .35567 .22063 -2.2385 .89890 77.73 
CPR total .34023 .17056 -5.14974 .98977  
       
CPR03, for instante, is the payout ratio estimated by using a Tobit model for the year 2003 in order to solve the censure 
problem. Correct classification stands for the percentage of correct classification arising from a Probit model including the 
same set of explanatory variables. 
 





Summary statistics of the estimated catering variable 
Variable Mean Standard deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
CAT86 .0000 .00741 -.33190 .33741 
CAT87 .0000 .04132 -.51434 2.7364 
CAT88 .0000 .09847 -1.2738 3.9961 
CAT89 .0000 .11973 -1.3468 4.4887 
CAT90 .0000 .14999 -1.7954 7.5654 
CAT91 .0000 .12923 -.638263 4.9983 
CAT92 .0000 .10002 -.674895 3.1729 
CAT93 .0000 .09917 -1.1421 2.6332 
CAT94 .0000 .12363 -1.4792 4.4738 
CAT95 .0000 .15705 -2.1455 7.9613 
CAT96 .0000 .18841 -2.2141 5.2106 
CAT97 .0000 .17873 -1.8571 5.4364 
CAT98 .0000 .19392 -2.1252 6.9161 
CAT99 .0000 .23339 -1.8219 8.1605 
CAT00 .0000 .18831 -1.0222 7.6399 
CAT01 .0000 .12530 -1.0556 4.6773 
CAT02 .0000 .09525 -2.5362 3.4662 
CAT03 .0000 .10524 -3.2830 3.7791 
CAT total .0000 .59634 -3.2830 8.1605 
 
Note that the catering variable comes from the error term of an explanatory value model and thereby its mean is always 
zero. 
 





Estimation results of the basic and extended models 
 I II 
Constant -.05732* (.018832) -.02273** (.01367) 
FCFit .38534* (.01989) .44124* (.01211) 
Dit .23181* (.01269) .22471* (.00937) 
NIit .22608* (.03379) .07396* (.02011) 
TANGit .21719* (.01167) .21248* (.00925) 
Sit .01955* (.00165) .01682* (.00121) 
CATit   .01781 (.00103) 
z1 431.30 (5) 769.21 (5) 
z2 1277.31 (16) 2250.85 (16) 
z3 35.27 (8) 64.34 (8) 
m1 -3.41 -3.40 
m2 -1.24 -0.98 
Hansen 428.51 (397) 505.19 (510) 
 
The regressions are performed by using the panel described in Table 2. The 
variables are defined in Table 3. The rest of the information needed to read this 
table is: i) Heteroskedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses. 
ii) *,** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; 
iii) z1, z2 and z3 are Wald tests of the joint significance of the reported coefficients, 
of the time dummies and of the country dummies, respectively, asymptotically 
distributed as χ2 under the null of no significance, degrees of freedom in 
parentheses; iv) mi is a serial correlation test of order i using residuals in first 
differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation; v) Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically 
distributed as χ2 under the null of no correlation between the instruments and the 
error term, degrees of freedom in parentheses. 
 





Estimation results of the moderating role of certain firm characteristics 
              I     II III 
Constant .0484*** (.02764) -.06136** (.02651) .08452 (.02806) 
FCFit .40301* (.01329) .39978* (.01285) .41178* (.01399) 
Dit .23441* (.01239) .37364* (.01391) .21581* (.01224) 
NIit .10179* (.02114) .13973* (.02194) .05817* (.02238) 
TANGit .27127* (.01118) .27764* (.01167) .25512* (.01145) 
Sit .02595* (.00220) .03002* (.00219) .02414* (.00227) 
CATit  .00446 (.00273) -.13649* (.00584) .01104* (.00135) 
CATitDVit .02325* (.00330) .18262* (.00647) .06480* (.06480) 
T  25.07 14.75 
z1 618.18 (7) 586.61 (7) 411.58 (7) 
z2 1702.17 (16) 1674.44 (16) 1552.86 (16) 
z3 146.34 (8) 131.17 (8) 166.17 (8) 
m1 -3.39 -3.42 -3.39 
m2 -.80 -0.43 -1.09 
Hansen 483.96 (502) 481.59 (502) 475.67 (502) 
 
The regressions are performed by using the panel described in Table 2. DVit is a dummy variable that takes the 
following values: a) 1 if the level of liquid assets is above the sample median, and 0 otherwise in Column I; b) 1 if 
Tobin’s q is higher than unity, and 0 otherwise in Column II; c) 1 if the free cash flow is above the sample median, 
and 0 otherwise in Column III. The remainder of the variables is defined in Table 3. The rest of the information 
needed to read this table is: i) Heteroskedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses. ii) *,** and *** 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; iii) t is the t-statistic for the linear restriction test under 
the null hypothesis of no significance; iv) z1, z2 and z3 are Wald tests of the joint significance of the reported 
coefficients, of the time dummies and of the country dummies, respectively, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the 
null of no significance, degrees of freedom in parentheses; v) mi is a serial correlation test of order i using residuals in 
first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation; vi) Hansen is a test of the 
over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no correlation between the instruments 
and the error term, degrees of freedom in parentheses. 
 
